Geo-Political

The Myth of the Sin the Mahatma Would Not Commit – Chapter 3

The Young Indian Nationalist

Unlike Rahmat Ali’s fiery spirit and radical thinking Jinnah’s enduring wisdom infused with a rather uncompromising idealist fervor did tend to tarry a while before this most sincere and passionate ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, who staunchly opposed the founding of All India Muslim League (ML) in 1906 and instead joined heads with Hindus, Parsis, Christians and 44 like-minded Muslims in the annual session of All India Congress that year, after all reached the same conclusion as Iqbal and Rahmat Ali.

Jinnah dearly held onto the western notions of secularism and territorial nationalism for over 2 decades following his return from England in 1896 as the youngest Lincoln- Inn barrister in British India at 20.  He entered British Indian politics as an ardent advocate of Pan-Indian nationalism – the consummate idealist that young Jinnah was, for long he believed ‘India’s only hope of emerging as a national entity, independent and strong, from under the heel of British imperial rule was through prior abatement of communal fears, suspicions, and residual anxieties’.  And owing to his law abiding nature he abhorred the idea of employing unconstitutional methods to achieve political goals.  Congress’s projected secularist-nationalist stance rendered it Jinnah’s natural choice as the springboard for his youthful political ambition enthused by his naive idealism.  He found more compatibility of thought among the liberal non-Muslim elites of various communities inhabiting India than among his own brethren in faith.  Quite understandable in the wake of the fact Jinnah’s intellectual grooming occurred during his years in England at young age and impressions of early upbringing in a Muslim house-hold recessed into the unconscious mind swiftly leaving him charmed by modern traditions of liberalism, secularism and nationalism.  And this was also why when he eventually consented to join the ML in 1913 it was only because the League initiated to redefine its objectives in the aftermath of the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911.  The British-loyalist approach previously considered a safeguard against Hindu encroachment on Muslim rights was reviewed, the ML resolved to redirect its effort towards inter-communal unity and national harmony and like the Congress the League declared to seek complete self-rule for India as a British dominion.  Fact was Jinnah remained at odds with a vast majority of the ML members thereafter vis-à-vis communal electorates – an idea he perceived was harbinger of disharmony in national life.  The reason why his decision to contest the membership of the legislative council against the Bombay Muslim seat in 1909, following ‘skirmishes’ between two elder Muslim candidates during the preliminary phase, was viewed sarcastically as an act of opportunism.  Yet for Jinnah who ‘never faltered at acting with surgical swiftness to alter his career’ it might have been simply the most pragmatic choice in the circumstances – one that did not necessitate much more than an individual compromise; a personal concession he permitted himself.  Albeit in retrospection he must have looked upon the twist as an ironic stroke of fate intended ‘to raise his individual consciousness of the Muslim identity’, entirely in line with the course of his personal evolution – quite unbeknown to him at the time.

In fact many a new insight made way into his consciousness during the years to follow – particularly from 1913 onward when he was member of the Congress and also the League, not to forget ‘inside the government’s camp in London and Calcutta’.  A unique vantage point that allowed him a rather three dimensional view.  Hence in October 1916 when Jinnah addressed the Bombay Provincial Conference and talked about Hindu-Muslim unity, he did not only speak like a nationalist, but also an advocate of the Indian Muslim, urging the majority community to be ‘generous and liberal’ and bear the ‘burden of sacrifice’ involved in ‘the matter of separate electorates’.  And the year ended with the Congress and ML agreeing upon the Lucknow Pact – ‘a blueprint of independent India’s constitution’ – a reflection of Jinnah’s newfound appreciation of Muslim anxieties, his ingenuous legal intellect, and an assertion of his negotiating potential, which he thought would realize the ideal of communal parity in India through constitutional reforms.  Little did Jinnah know how nonchalant the British refusal to implement the Lucknow Pact would be – quite likely the chief reason why Congress conferred its consent in the first place.  The Empire was fully engaged with WW1 – the will of political India was not a current priority – all it wanted from India was more men in the British Indian Army to fight the Ottomans, which Gandhi would soon facilitate, and not demands for reforms or self-rule.

Gandhi made his mark on the Congress following the demise of consummate nationalists Gokhale and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta in 1915 – a time when Jinnah most definitely stood as a highly deserving candidate to head the moderate guard in Congress.  Both Gandhi and Motilal (the elder Nehru) admired Jinnah but in a rather twisted manner – more of patronizing than genuine appreciation – they would commend Jinnah’s ardor for nationalism and his ambassadorship of Hindu-Muslim unity in one breath, and single him out as a Mohammedan in the very next.  And neither was willing to let the leadership of India’s struggle for self-rule pass onto Jinnah despite his eminence – for reasons more insidious than mere personal competition.

Jinnah first awakened to the duplicity of Hindu dealings in 1917-1918 – about the same time when the British Empire’s wartime priorities also threw off its highly prized cloak of modern western values.

During the days of WW1 Gandhi on one hand played the Indian Muslim for popular support by making a rallying cry out of the Ali Brothers who were under house-arrest for ‘promoting sympathy for the King’s enemies’, while on the other the Mahatma won British favor by employing his influence to urge the Indians to enlist in the British Indian Army and fight the King’s enemies – positions so evidently inconsistent that even Mahatma’s disciples must have found these ‘Experiments with Truth’ difficult to digest.  “Can you not see that if every Home Rule Leaguer became a potent recruiting agency whilst at the same time fighting for constitutional rights we should ensure the passing of the Congress-League scheme?  Seek ye first the recruiting office and everything will be added unto you” wrote the Mahatma to Jinnah revealing his ability and readiness to double-deal for political gains.  Jinnah did not respond rather publicly denounced the British rulers for double standards and demanded “Indians should be put on the same footing as the European British subjects before being asked to fight” – earning great displeasure of the Viceroy who saw Jinnah’s standpoint as ‘bargaining’ only to face another sharp retort “Is it bargaining… to tell my Government face to face that this bar must be removed?  Is it bargaining, My Lord, to say that in my own country, I should be put on the same footing as the European British Subjects?  Is that bargaining?… We cannot ask our young men to fight for principles, the application of which is denied to their own country”.   

Implementation of the 1919 Rowlatt Act, which in essence extended the British right to execute emergency measures even after WW1 ended, further infuriated Jinnah against the British – he remarked “a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilized Government” and tendered his resignation from the Viceroy’s Council.  British Indian officials were enraged.  And at a time when Jinnah wistfully called British promises to ‘poor Turkey’ a ‘scrap of paper’ yet voiced faith in Montagu’s intended reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 1919), the likes of Chelmsford, Willingdon and George Lloyd remained unwilling to surrender their ‘wooden and antediluvian imperial attitude’.  Instead their prejudiced cunning resolved to portray the ‘eminently moderate and flexible, brilliant constitutional lawyer and negotiator’ as ‘irreconcilable, fair of speech and black of heart’ to the establishment in London in a direct bid to sabotage the probability of Jinnah’s one-to-one interaction with the Secretary of State for India.  After all, had not Montagu voiced the thought “it was an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country”.  British hawks in India feared and rightfully so, the capable and charismatic Jinnah might just convince the willing and able Montagu to permit the ‘little black men’ greater right to self-governance not to mention more parity for the Muslim than must be conceded.

Had their intention been sincere in allowing India’s move towards constitutional reforms and settlement of the Hindu-Muslim feud following the end of WW1, the British Indian officials would not have side-lined Jinnah – the one strong and sensible voice speaking in favor of moderate legislative change when Gandhi was fast leading Congress towards a non-cooperation movement in a bid to pressure the British into awarding India the right to complete self-rule.  Undermining Jinnah’s veracity exposed the depth of slyness sitting at the core of British imperialism.  And in a way also vindicated Gandhi’s appeal for civil disobedience – a call that caused Jinnah to be voted down and howled at by the Mahatma’s enthused followers at Congress’ Nagpur session in 1920.  His word of caution fell on deaf ears – and after over 2 decades Jinnah found himself too counter revolutionary to the Hindu taste and said farewell to his long standing relationship with the Congress.

The years 1916-20 thus marked the beginning of the end of Jinnah’s naive faith in western values and his unwary trust in Congress’ politics.  Happenings during the period revealed undeniable signs of British deviousness – not just vis-à-vis India but also the Ottomans and Arab Muslims.  Jinnah was forced to admit how emphatically the Rowlatt Act exhibited British apathy towards the essential rights of their Indian subjects.  He could not but view General Dyer’s exoneration by the Royal Commission and the celebration of his crimes in the context of the Jalianwala massacre, as a blatant testimony to the fact “there can be no justice when there is a conflict between an Englishman and an Indian”.  And he was pushed to call the geo-political game of Mandates in the Middle East following the fall of the Ottomans “an attack on our Faith”.  Apathetic arrogance of British imperialism and the conceited shallowness of Congress’ politics was at last beginning to lead Jinnah farther away from his faith in modern ideals of the western civilization.  He could no longer sustain his secular indifference of earlier days when it came to the undermining of Muslim interest within or without India.  Nor did he find in himself the conviction to bear the “political hysteria” that overwhelmed Congress under the Mahatma.  ‘His mind raced years ahead of most of his contemporaries British and Indian alike’ – for him enacting a revolutionary approach at the time only implied handing over India to political anarchy thereby placing Muslim India at the mercy of cruel circumstance.

Death of Jinnah’s Youthful Idealism

Wily political gimmicks continued through the next decade of Jinnah’s political voyage, under the pretense of attempting to resolve the Indian problem, killing the last remnants of idealistic fervor left in him.

Jinnah witnessed how Gandhi’s non-cooperation mania successfully sabotaged another opportunity for reconciliation initiated by him at the new Viceroy’s behest.  The Viceroy wanted to reopen communication with political India amidst the drama of Gandhi’s lukewarm non-cooperation movement fearing the prospect of violence, but the Mahatma obstinately insisted any reconciliatory effort would be premature at the time since “India had not yet incontestably proven her strength” – albeit less than a fortnight later, well before any such proof was furnished by India, 22 policemen were killed inside their station in a United Province town by Mahatma’s fanatical followers and he after all admitted the gravity of his miscalculation.  But quite evidently there did not remain much reason for Lord Reading to negotiate a new constitution with the natives after such ‘mayhem and abject surrender’.  In more or less the same spirit of artfulness Gandhi discouraged Jinnah’s next efforts to save the sinking ship of Indian nationalism and fully employed his immense influence upon the Hindu – twice when Jinnah attempted to put together a new moderate nationalistic bloc, the Mahatma ‘s power of persuasion worked its miracle on the professed Hindu moderates and nationalists leaving Jinnah empty-handed.

The last few nails in the coffin of Jinnah’s naive idealism came toward the end of 1920s in quite a rapid succession.

First came the Simon Commission that was to devise an all-White formula for India’s constitutional advancement – Lord Birkenhead’s pigheadedness insisted Indians must be kept from participation in any such effort – “it does not do to take these people seriously” he opined.  Jinnah denounced the Commission as “butchery of our souls… declaring our unfitness for self-government” and thanked the Hindu for extending the hand of fellowship only to find it withdrawn soon cutting short any euphoria he might have experienced at this rather unanticipated display of ‘nationalistic spirit’.  The All Parties Conference that was convened to formulate an Indian constitutional alternative proved futile – the Hindu was not willing to concede to separate electorates or constitutional concessions to the Muslim.

Next came the Nehru Report that emerged from the deliberations of the Nehru Commission – Congress’ counterpart to the Simon Commission.  Jinnah refused to view it as anything more than the ‘Hindu position’ on his 1927 Delhi Muslim Proposals, and called upon the Indian Muslim to “organize, stand united, and press every reasonable point for the protection of the community” – unsuspecting of the new shock in stock for him.  Quite a few among the ML members stood enamored of the Nehru Report – unable to comprehend repercussions of its ambiguity or admit their own naivety.  Consensus was somehow struck – and Jinnah presented the Muslim case at the National Convention in December 1928 demanding three amendments to the Nehru Report albeit to no avail – the “Hindu jury” had its mind made up.  Their fanning of dissent in ML’s ranks furnished a perfect alibi.  After all had not the Muslim members of Congress and some ML leaders endorsed the Nehru Report in its totality prior to Jinnah’s dismissal?  Why should the Hindu then succumb to a “spoilt and naughty child’s” demands even if ‘the child’ was prudent enough to see through their underhanded attempt to manipulate the Muslim?

Thus on January 1, 1929 when Jinnah made an appearance at the All Parties Muslim Conference – ‘a vast gathering representative of all shades of Muslim opinion’ – he might not have been too sure if he belonged to the gathering he was in, but he was definite he did not belong to the crowd he left behind in Calcutta.  The optimistic view of communal unity he held onto so dearly for so long not to mention his prolonged faith in the righteousness of western values was all but shattered never to find life again.

A month later sense of injury deepened still more when Ruttie, the only love of his life, embraced death after a prolonged illness.  The blossoming of love between them back in 1916 was like an affirmation of Jinnah’s youthful political idealism in personal life – proof that union despite apparent divisions was not just a dream and could translate into tangible reality.  But more or less parallel to the woes of his political struggle thereafter, ran the tragic story of his love.  The invisible hand of fate continued to nudge at Jinnah, urging him to become cognizant of the harsh actualities of life born out of the essential human condition spoken of by Lord Buddha that do not permit idealistic optimism the water of life for too long.  And just as the gap between him and his Hindu-British colleagues continued to widen owing to unforgiving ground realities, the disparity resulting from a vast age difference and varied communal background – ‘increasingly divergent interests and temperaments’ – came to precipitate a sense of separation between him and Ruttie too.  Hence in February 1929 Jinnah was mourning not only Ruttie, but also the demise of his own robust idealism that died as sorrowful, bitter and swift a death.  “A curtain fell over him” but many other veils were lifted in that state of humbleness and emptiness which contains the power to dissolve all illusions obscuring the infinite from human intellect.

Jinnah Comes Full Circle

The years 1930-37 marked a significant transitory period in the evolution of Jinnah’s person – the imperceptible vision of Pakistan that Jinnah alluded to as his first fore-teller of the journey ahead, during his interview with Evelyn Wrench, came in 1930.  And what transpired thereafter only tended to furnish in tangible terms the logic behind that foresight.  Jinnah’s view of the Hindu’s stride and the British shifts would confirm he was done delivering ‘his swan song to Indian nationalism’ – in fact he would go on to claim rightful ownership of Muslim India. 

Congress’ resolve to reset its goal to ‘full independence’ versus ‘dominion status’ in December 1929 verified the Mahatma was all set to push the British into granting India complete freedom with perceivable consequences for Muslim India.  Jinnah saw the shift coming in Gandhi’s threat of more civil disobedience earlier that year when execution of the “extremely ambiguous” Nehru Report was demanded by Congress despite Jinnah’s categorical assertion the Report was unacceptable to the Muslim.  The fear of a gloomy eventuality for the Muslim drove him to propose a series of Round Table Conferences to the British in an attempt to hash out the Muslim question.  Although Ramsay MacDonald’s rather understanding presence in London and viceroy Irwin’s somewhat empathetic tilt towards Jinnah facilitated materialization of his proposition, the effort was massively undermined by Congress’s radical demand for independence during the preliminary meetings.  And in the end the exercise was reduced to a mere “jamboree” as Jinnah remarked with Gandhi fooling the British and vice-versa while the deadlock remained.  If anything Jinnah managed to gain the displeasure of the British owing to what they called his ‘non-cooperative stance’ – maybe his declining the carrot that came concealed in Ramsay’s flattering overture was viewed as disobedience or his insistence on the 14 Points as rebelliousness – or perhaps the fact Jinnah presented Muslim India as a separate entity as distinct as the Hindu, British and the princely states that did not sit right with the Hinduin any case he was not invited for the third conference and left to lick his wounds.

‘Jinnah’s years of order and contemplation wedged between the time of early struggle and the final storm of conquest’ were spent mostly in London practicing as a barrister before the Privy Council from 1930-31 onward.  And it was the want of his presence that Muslims from the United Provinces attempted in all earnestness to convince him to return and take charge of the destiny of Muslim India in 1933-34 – plagued with dispute in its ranks the ML was in dire need of commanding leadership.  In October 1934 Bombay Muslims in fact went ahead and elected Jinnah for the central legislative assembly during his absence compelling him to make a comeback.  Following the return, Jinnah’s conversion to the Muslim cause was sealed through an exchange that Akbar calls ‘passing of the flame’.  Iqbal’s outcry on behalf of the “numerically weak, educationally backward and economically nowhere” Indian Muslim – coincidentally 80-90 million strong – proved to be just that last nudge Jinnah was prepared for during his long voyage in the tumultuous and murky waters of secular-nationalistic politics of British India.  From thereon ‘in his clothes, aspirations, rhetoric and speeches he expressed Muslim identity and the future of Islam.  It was as if Jinnah was finally coming home, as if after a long journey of discovery he had returned to his roots.  He had come to terms with his identity and culture’ – and fully surrendered to the logic of Iqbal’s religious idealism rooted in Islam’s philosophy.  Albeit contemporary scholarship in perfect cohesion with the traditional British viewpoint – ignorant of the spiritual premise that enables an insightful comprehension of the paradox overshadowing Jinnah’s evolution – tends to suggest he simply found it convenient to piggyback on Islamic identity to avenge ‘shattered dreams, passion turned to ashes… pride’ of yesteryear.

The 1937 Watershed

The 1937 provincial elections under the India Act 1935, which Jinnah viewed as British attempt to impose a constitutional framework upon India against the will of her people, was undoubtedly the one turning point that served to validate the logic of Jinnah’s rarely understood and bitterly criticized conversion to Islam’s ideology more vociferously than any other hitherto albeit after the fact.

Congress’ hypocritical election campaign ran on its appeal to secular Indian nationalism – there was no third party in India besides the Congress and the British it was conceitedly declared, and Congress thoroughly exploited the anti-British sentiment among gullible masses.  Simpletons across India were told to vote against the Congress was to vote for the continuation of the British Raj and also that unlike the ML, which only represented the elite Muslim class, the Congress was concerned about the poverty of Muslim masses.  Jinnah’s retort affirmed the stance taken earlier at the First Round Table Conference – he forcefully asserted “There is a third party in this country and that is the Muslim” and warned the Hindu to “leave the Muslims alone”.  The word of the ‘Sole Spokesman’ of Muslim India however did little to halt the stride of Hindu impatience for executive control.  In fact Jinnah would find himself repeating the same theme over and over again through the next ten years – reiterating to the Hindu and the British that Muslim India was a significant force to reckon with and granted parity in national life not just another minority willing to let its destiny be commanded by their conniving prejudice.  Albeit the ML drive under Jinnah fell apart miserably and the League did not emerge as the sole voice of Muslim India in the 1937 provincial elections owing to lingering internal disorganization, widespread ignorance among the masses, and the weakness of flesh or lack of foresight among the elite, the terrible aftermath of the election incontestably verified the hypocrisy of Congress’ secular-nationalistic politics and substantiated Jinnah’s suspicion that Congress “pursued an exclusively Hindu policy”.  Even some British voices could not help but remark on the ‘rising tide of Hindu rule’ calling it the ‘rising tide of political Hinduism’ and author Beverley Nichols wrote of Congress:

“As soon as it was in power in these provinces, it dropped the mask.  Instead of inviting the Muslims to share the fruits of office, instead of attempting any form of coalition, it rigidly excluded them from all responsibility.  But it did not confine its autocracy to political matters; it proceeded to attack the Muslims in every branch of their material and spiritual life.”

The systematic manner in which the Congress provincial ministries sought to diminish the Muslim identity, once executive power rested in their hands, rightfully reminded the cognizant Muslim of the Brahmin’s yearning to rid India of Islam – it never ceased to lurk underneath their apparent dealings since the days of Muslim hegemony in India.  Congress’ secular facade laid bare with not even tatters to hide the real face making it evident the Brahmin king-maker was unwilling to permit the Muslim to flourish as an equal and shall only facilitate that which would stifle the Indo-Islamic identity into  extinction.

Another actuality that also strengthened in the conscious Muslim mind following the 1937 election saga was the “gentlemanly agreement” that remained intact between the Hindu and the British – after all the absolute lack of fair play in the formation of provincial governments and widespread anti-Muslim atrocities all occurred under the watchful eyes of the British Governors and the Viceroy – whether too meek to interfere, just complacent or partners in crime.

The rude awakening experienced firsthand by the Indian Muslim in 1937 was just the propeller that ML needed to transform the League into a mass movement.  Jinnah called upon the Muslims to “recapture their souls” and leave behind days of “disillusionment, desperation, religious bigotry, political disharmony and discord”.  He canvassed across India to convince as many political parties with Muslim bases as possible to align with the ML notwithstanding intensified bouts of fever and cough.  He was carrying a compounded malignant disease of the lungs since Ruttie’s death but nonchalantly dismissed the concern to invigorate and reorganize the ML and reorient its effort towards mass penetration with the singular aim of raising Muslim political consciousness.  Although the likes of Wolpert imply the ‘cry of Islam in danger’ was employed to manipulate the religious Muslim sentiment in an attempt to amass popularity, the obvious fact was Islam was alluded to recurrently because it sat at the heart of the Hindu-Muslim question that continued to overwhelm the socio-political horizon of British India.

ML’s victory in 1937 by-elections even in rural constituencies where Congress’ hold on mass Muslim population was thought to be firm sent shock-waves across the Hindu chain of command.  Nehru and Gandhi appealed to Jinnah to join hands in the name of national unity and progress but their scheme fell desperately short – they expected Jinnah would fall for the lure and lay waste the fruits of ML’s vigorous labor not to forget betray Muslim India that rallied behind him.  Jinnah however saw clearly through the Congress intent and continued to tell his growing Muslim audience “Congress killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of fascism” – there was no reason left for the Muslim to believe Congress was much more than a Hindu body working for the revival of Hinduism at the expense of all other natives.

Conviction and Clarity Grow

The three reports on Muslim grievances prepared by the ML rolled out periodically through the tenure of Congress’ provincial ministries yet did little to stimulate imperial smugness into action or alter the vain conduct of the Hindu in over 2 years before WW2.

With Muslims numbering among the highest in British Indian Army and Congress inclined to oppose Indian involvement in the war, viceroy Linlithgow was anxious for ML’s support – he feared without the ML the government would not be able to muster majority in the central assembly at critical junctures while the Empire was also in dire need of many more Muslim men in the British Indian Army.  He cajoled Jinnah and asked if it made Jinnah happy, he would “throw out” Congress ministries – the Viceroy was resolved to play the Muslim for maximum benefit not barring clandestine backing of the anti-Jinnah British loyalist element among the Muslim political elite.  Jinnah however remained prudent judging the circumstance discreetly in order to ensure maximum political gain for the Muslim in exchange of ML’s wartime support while he mused upon the reorientation underway in political India.  The aftermath of the 1937 provincial elections and the Hindu attempts to politicize the over 500 princely states eliminated any lingering doubts Jinnah might have entertained if at all – he was convinced the ‘federation umbrella was just one more Hindu Raj trap set for Muslims’.  And that was why he actually told Linlithgow on September 4, 1939 there was no political solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem, the only resolution was to divide India.  Ripple effect from that bombshell must have traveled far and quick – after all Jinnah’s ‘evil’ thought of dividing India could not be taken lightly – it was imperative to nip it in the bud.

Congress, with the backing of Nehru’s Labor comrades in London, decided to gamble for complete independence of India – its avowed goal since December 1929.  Sir Stafford Cripps thought the British cabinet could be pressured into declaring its immediate willingness to grant India full dominion status along with the right to a constituent assembly that would vote based on simple majority, if only Congress intimated strong wartime demand for India’s independence.  And Congress resigned from the provincial ministries on October 22, 1939 hoping to make immediate gains off the British Empire burdened by the weight of the world war.  Gandhi evidently aware of Jinnah’s thought of partition appealed indirectly through his journal and asked the ML to join hands with the Congress to “fight for the independence of an undivided India” hoping “the League did not wish to vivisect India”.  Jinnah’s most unambiguous answer came in the form of a rather dramatic statement that called for a day of celebration on December 22 – a Day of Deliverance from Congress’ provincial Hindu Raj.

In January 1940 the Viceroy announced “full dominion status was the goal of the British government” and that the India Act 1935 scheme would be reopened with increased Indian political representation in the central council as soon as practicable.  The implied ambiguity of the Viceroy’s declaration in the wake of Congress’ pressure and Linlithgow’s personal fondness of the 1935 framework made Jinnah all the more cognizant of the good cop-bad cop schemes that frequently attempted to resolve the Hindu-Muslim problem nonetheless always evaded the root cause, and fearful of a “dishonorable settlement” between the Hindu and the British on the lines of the 1935 Act, Jinnah categorically told Linlithgow Muslim wartime support shall remain only “if an undertaking is given that no political settlement will be reached with Congress without the previous consent of Muslims”.  And only 2 months later he would press forward by articulating the demand for Pakistan as the only equitable solution for Muslim India setting the Indian political stage on fire.

To be continued…

Glossary of References:
  • Approaches to the Study of Conversion to Islam in India – By Richard M. Eaton
  • A Historical View of Islam in South Asia By Barbra D. Metcalf
  • Creating a New Medina By Venkan Dhulipala
  • History of Hindu Imperialism By Swami Dharma Theertha
  • Jinnah of Pakistan By Stanley Wolpert
  • Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity – The Search for Saladin By Akbar S. Ahmed
  • Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy By Alastair Lamb
  • Now or Never – Are We to Perish Forever? By Chaudhry Rahmat Ali
  • Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam – By Sir Mohammad Iqbal

 

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